

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-12

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USNMR SHAPE BRUSSELS BELGIUM
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MBFR VIENNA 0099

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: MARCH 2 WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

AT THE 162ND PLENARY MEETING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WAS
HELD ON MARCH 2 UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF LUXEMBOURG REP (WINTER),
BELGIAN REP (SMOLDEREN) DELIVERED THE ONLY STATEMENT. IN HIS
PRESENTATION, SMOLDEREN EXPLAINED THE WESTERN REQUIREMENT FOR
COLLECTIVE CEILINGS AND RESPONDED TO EASTERN CRITICISMS OF THE
CONCEPT. THE MAIN POINTS OF THE BELGIAN STATEMENT, THE FULL TEXT
OF WHICH FOLLOWS BY AIRGRAM WERE:

1) IT IS THE FINAL OUTCOME OF AN AGREEMENT, RATHER THAN REDUCT-
IONS IN ISOLATION, WHICH IS THE DETERMINING CONSIDERATION SINCE
THE LIMITATIONS RESULTING FROM AN AGREEMENT WILL CONSTITUTE
THE FOUNDATION ON WHICH THE SECURITY OF EUROPE AFTER AN AGREE-
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MENT WILL BE BASED.

2) IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE MORE STABLE SECURITY SITUATION
CREATED BY AN AGREEMENT, WESTERN PARTICIPANTS MUST BE ABLE TO
MAINTAIN THEIR FORCES AT THE AGREED, POST-REDUCTION LEVELS.

3) OTHERWISE, UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS COULD LEAD TO DESTABILIZING

FORCE IMBALANCES WHICH COULD UNDERMINE AN AGREEMENT TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE SECURITY OF ALL.

4) TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM, THE WEST HAS PROPOSED COLLECTIVE CEILINGS WHICH ARE AN OUTGROWTH OF THE WEST'S LONG AND SUCCESSFUL EXPERIENCE WITH A MULTINATIONAL SYSTEM OF INTEGRATED DEFENCE.

5) THIS SYSTEM, WHICH IS AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT OF WESTERN SECURITY, WOULD BE JEOPARDIZED BY THE IMPOSITION OF NATIONAL CEILINGS SUCH AS THOSE PROPOSED BY THE EAST.

6) AMBASSADOR FODOR'S RECENT STATEMENT THAT THE WESTERN SYSTEM OF INTEGRATED DEFENSE HAS FUNCTIONED SUCCESSFULLY TO DATE WITHOUT COLLECTIVE CEILINGS IS ENTIRELY CORRECT SINCE, IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AGREEMENT, NO CEILINGS ARE IN FORCE.

7) SUCH EASTERN ARGUMENTS REVEAL THAT THE EAST FAILS TO GRASP THE ESSENTIAL POINT THAT THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE EXISTING SECURITY SITUATION AND THAT WHICH WOULD PREVAIL AFTER THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF AN AGREEMENT.

8) A FURTHER REASON FOR COLLECTIVE CEILINGS IS THE DETERMINATION OF WESTERN PARTICIPANTS THAT AN AGREEMENT MUST NOT PREJUDICE THE FUTURE ORGANIZATION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENSE.

9) NATIONAL CEILINGS, WHICH ENTAIL GRAVE RISKS TO STABILITY AND CONFIDENTIAL

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SECURITY, WOULD NOT COVER THE PROBLEM OF FUTURE UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS AS EASTERN PARTICIPANTS THEMSELVES HAVE ADMITTED.

10) SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET AND US FORCES IN THE AREA ARE CALLED FOR BY THE WORLD POWER STATUS OF THESE TWO NATIONS AND BY THE GEOGRAPHIC ADVANTAGES ENJOYED BY THE SOVIET UNION DUE TO ITS LOCATION ADJACENT TO THE REDUCTION AREA.

11) WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES DO NOT ACCEPT EASTERN ARGUMENTS THAT ESTABLISHING COLLECTIVE CEILINGS IN A TREATY TO BE SIGNED BY INDIVIDUAL STATES WOULD PRESENT JURIDICAL DIFFICULTIES.

12) THE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR CARRYING OUT THE COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN IN AN AGREEMENT WOULD REST WITH THE STATES PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT.

13) EASTERN CRITICISMS OF COLLECTIVE CEILINGS HAVE NO BASIS IN REALITY AS SUCH CEILINGS ARE SIMPLE, PRACTICABLE AND IN ACCORD WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF STRENGTHENING SECURITY AND STABILITY.

14) EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE THE VALUE OF THE CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE CEILINGS ONCE THEY EXAMINE ALL ASPECTS

OF IT.RESOR

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